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INTRODUCTION

The religious revival observed throughout the world since the
1980s' is making its mark on legal theory, threatening to shift the jut Senior Lecturer, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. I wish to thankJeff
Rachlinski, Dean Hanoch Dagan, Ariel Porat, the Cornell Law Review for organizing "The
Future of Legal Theory" conference, and the conference's participants for wonderful discussions. I also thank Jos6 Brunner, Hanoch Dagan, Jerry Frug, Eva Ilouz, Omri Kletter,
Roy Kreitner, Shai Lavi, Menachem Mautner, Ariel Porat, Pierre Schlag, Galia
Schneebaum, Dori Spivak, Chris Tomlins, Manal Totry-Jubran, Issi Rosen-Zvi, and the participants of the Tel Aviv University Law School Faculty Seminar and of the Interdisciplinary
Center Law School Faculty Seminar for excellent comments and suggestions. This Essay
originated in the puzzlement that I experienced when some of my students told me that
critical legal studies, law and economics, and other functional theories of the law were
unsatisfactory because they had an "impoverished" vision of the law. My students suggested that formalism and "law as culture" were good antidotes to these "thin" conceptions
of the law. This Essay is an attempt to theorize and better understand this challenge.
The thesis that since the 1980s the world has been experiencing a "religious reviI
val" and a publicization of religion-a reversal of the tide of its privatization-has been
crucial to religious studies as well as the study of secularization and modernization
processes; it has been debated ever since. See, e.g.,Jost CASANOVA, PUBLIc RELIGIONS IN THE
MODERN WORLD (1994); Thomas Luckmann, Shrinking Transcendence, ExpandingReligion?,
51 Soc. ANALYSIS 127, 127-28 (1990).
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risprudential battleground from debates over law's indeterminacy and
power to conflicts over law's grounds, meaning, unity, coherence, and
metaphysical underpinnings.2 Following the immense impact of the
legal-realist movement on American jurisprudence, 3 the major jurisprudential conflicts in the United States throughout the twentieth
century revolved around the themes of the indeterminacy and power
inherent in adjudication (and the resulting delegitimization of it), pitting theories that emphasized these critical themes against schools of
thought that tried to reconstruct and reconstitute the determinacy
and legitimacy of adjudication. 4 I argue in this Essay, however, that
over the past couple of decades, a new jurisprudential dividing line
has emerged without attracting much notice or attention. This new
divide, which I draw in this Essay, is between thinkers who adhere to a
disenchanted, instrumentalist, and secularized view of the law and theoreticians who try to reenchant it by reintroducing a degree of magic,
sacredness, and mystery into the law; by reconnecting it to a transcendental or even divine sphere; by finding unity and coherence in the
entirety of the legal field; and by bringing metaphysics "back" into the
study of law.5
The different reenchanting schools of thought dispute the characteristics that the disenchanted view of law attributes to law: its instrumentality and functionality, its secularism, its pragmatism, its
profound historicity, its dubious moral grounds, its fragmentary nature, and its lack of a transcendental meaning or essence. 6 Not all
those whom I call reenchanters, however, attack all of these traits of
the disenchanted law; for different scholars, some of these traits are
more problematic than others. Yet I argue in this Essay that they share
a position that is antithetical to the basic tenets of the disenchanted
view of law, which still dominates, by and large, American legal theory.
2 In fact, the move toward reenchantment is, I would argue, what also underlies the
religious revival. Put differently, mystical and irrationalist trends, which were for a long
period marginalized in both religion and law, are moving to the forefront, regaining prominence and influence.
3 The legal realists did not only impact the realm of jurisprudence. Their voluminous writings, as well as their different careers and professional trajectories, dealt with and
influenced legal institutions, substantive legal fields, legal reforms, and the entire structure
of government. For recent works discussing the diverse and far-reaching impacts that legal
realists had on these various aspects of the legal system, see, for example, DALIA TsUK
MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL

2-8 (2007); SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 76-78
(2005); Roy Kreitner, BiographingRealistJurisprudence,35 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 765, 765-67
(2010) (reviewing TsUK MITCHELL, supra, and WALLER, supra).
4 See Kreitner, supra note 3, at 784-88. For a recent articulation of the impact of the
debate between realists and formalists in the U.S., see Pierre Schlag, Formalismand Realism
in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REv. 195, 199-200, 223-43 (2009).
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part II.
PLURALISM
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Thus a new stage in the evolution of modern legal theory is emerging
in which formal legal rationality is no longer the high point of legal
disenchantment (as Max Weber saw it)7 but a model for law's reenchantment as against the almost universally accepted disenchanting
legal theories.8 And although the question of legal interpretationand the possibility of objective and legitimate adjudication-is still
motivating some of these theories,9 the reenchanting theories aim to
shift the jurisprudential debates from questions of the consequences
of legal principles and rules to fundamental questions concerning the
grounds of law. This ground shifting might invoke new jurisprudential conflicts between secularism and religiosity, between pragmatism
and metaphysics, and between critical and magical thinking.1 0
I first describe the concept of disenchantment, both of the world
and of the legal spheres. Then I turn to describe four exemplary
(though not exhaustive) modes of legal reenchantment that have
emerged over the last thirty years. Lastly, I evaluate the ramifications
and significance of these reenchanting theories and their possible
futures.
I
THE DISENCHANTMENT OF LAw
Weber's shattering description of Western society as one that has
been gradually "disenchanted"" has profoundly affected the field of
social theory for nearly a decade. Key to understanding the modern
West's uniqueness and distinctness, disenchantment is a rich and multifaceted concept bundling together and illuminating processes of secularization, fragmentation, bureaucratization, division of labor, and
rationalization.12
7 Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max
Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 1050 (2004). For further elaboration on this point, see infta Part I.B.
8 Ironically, these disenchanting theories are the progenies of what for Weber symbolized the reenchantingand irrational moment in law: legal realism. See infra Part lB.
9 See, e.g., Alan Brudner, The Ideality of Difference: Toward Objectivity in Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOzo L. REV. 1133, 1198-210 (1990) (developing a formalist-inspired theory of
legal interpretation that also enables interpretative objectivity).
10
See infta Part II.
11 According to Weber, the process of disenchantment of the Occident has been going on "for millennia." See MAx WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS

276, 286 (Wolf Heydebrand ed., Hans A. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1994).
12 As one commentator argues, disenchantment is "the key concept within Weber's
account of the distinctiveness and significance of Western culture." Ralph Schroeder, Disenchantment and Its Discontents: Weberian Perspectives on Science and Technology, 43 Soc. REv.
227, 228 (1995). Weber himself alternated between several of these concepts-rationality,
instrumental rationality, rationalization, and disenchantment-and was not necessarily
committed to a strict usage of one rather than the other. One argues, however, that Weber
distinguished between religious disenchantment and Occidental rationalization and that
religious disenchantment was limited to the period that ended with Protestantism. See
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The Disenchantment of the World

Disenchantment is not a concept merely describing an objective
process that modern Western societies are experiencing. It is both
"an existential or phenomenological category" aimed at capturing the
essence of the way humans experience the modern world and modern
man's mode of being in a growingly disenchanted world.' 3 Hence,
disenchantment is a subjective-objective category that refers to real,
objective transformations and to their ideal, subjective correlates (and
vice versa). 1 4 It thus brings together tangible changes in reality-scientific discoveries; changes in art, politics, and sexuality; and a radical
transformation in religions-and the mental-existential alterations
that the human subject is undergoing. 15 And what disenchantment
entails is a set of losses and gains: loss of faith and gains of knowledge,
loss of magic and gains of causality, and loss of mystery and gains of
calculability. 16
It is important to note that disenchantment, as a general phenomenon, is prevalent throughout the social world in every realm of
human activity. And it is, first and foremost, a process that happens in
and to religions. Magic and revelation are no longer main avenues to
reach salvation; rather, they have been declared sacrilegious and superstitious.' 7 In their stead cannon law has evolved and church bureaucracy has appeared.1 8 In other words, religion itself-that
domain which might be thought of as the locus of enchantment-has
become disenchanted, detached from the miraculous and the otherFriedrich H. Tenbruck, The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber, 31 BRIT. J.
Soc. 316, 321-23 (1980). Regardless of this position (which concerns religious disenchantment), it is clear that disenchantment as a general phenomenon has not ended with the
rise of Protestant ethics and is still taking place. See Richard Jenkins, Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment:Max Weber at the Millennium, in 1 MAX WEBER STUD. 11, 15-20
(2000); Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1032 (suggesting that "the contemporary mode of legal
thought [is] an episode in the sequences of disenchantment and reenchantment suggested
by Weber's philosophy of history").
13 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1057.
14 See id. at 1056-57; Tenbruck, supra note 12, at 319-23.
15
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1056-57.
16 See id. There is no way to overemphasize the importance of calculability in Weber's
depiction of the evolution of the industrialized West. The development of a calculable and
rational legal system is imperative for the functioning of a sophisticated economic market.
See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 336-337 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968). For a detailed discussion of
this point, see David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L.
REv. 720, 732-45.
17
See Tenbruck, supra note 12, at 319 (quoting W.M. Sprondel's response to Weber's
work: "That great religious historical process of disenchantment of the world . . . disavows
all magical ways to salvation as a superstition and sacrilege. . . .").
18

MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM WITH OTHER

WRITINGS ON THE RISE OF THE WEsr 48-49 (Stephen Kalberg trans., Oxford Univ. Press 4th

ed. 2009); see Tenbruck, supra note 12, at 319.
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worldly, while undergoing processes of rationalization and bureaucratization.19 Magic and revelation are not eradicated from religions altogether, however. On the contrary, these elements are elevated and
celebrated within religious mysticism, a religious form that flourishes-albeit marginally-alongside the disenchanted, rational, and
bureaucratic religions. 20 Therefore, disenchantment is always coupled with its correlative yet marginalized "other," which I call in this
Essay reenchantment the irrational, the mystical, the magical, and the
transcendental.2 1
The process of disenchantment has been happening simultaneously in science, economy, art, politics, and sexuality. 22 Each of these
domains of human action has been gradually detached from religion
and the divine (i.e., secularized) and has been rationalized and
bureaucratized.2 3 The combination of such processes-disengagement from religion, rationalization, and bureaucratization-results in
the appearance of these various domains as autonomous, each operating according to its own distinct inner logic and internal procedures.2 4 Hence, disenchantment involves the experience of loss of
unity of the world (unity that existed in religion); its fragmentation;
and inability to make sense of, or find meaning in, the cosmos as a
whole. 25 Actors within each sphere are bound by its growing
bureaucratization and rationalization and are hence locked within the
famous "iron cage of modernity."2 6 Disenchantment is therefore
closely tied to the modern mode of domination: bureaucratic authorities that rule-and obtain their legitimacy-through the mechanical
and formal application of the various logics of the distinct spheres. 27
19 See 1 WEBER, supra note 16, at 399-635; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1056-57,
1061-63; Tenbruck, supra note 12, at 333-42.
20
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1057.
21 Another way of articulating the relationship between disenchantment and reenchantment is that the latter is the "dangerous supplement" of the former: the marginal,
repressed, and denied "complementary" of the main development or activity that threatens
to replace and fully supplant it. SeeJACQUEs DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (Gayatri

Chakravorty Spivak trans., The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967) (developing and
discussing the structure of "dangerous supplement" in Rousseau's philosophy). I am
thankful to Roy Kreitner for suggesting this idea to me.
22 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1063.
23

See id.

24 See Schroeder, supranote 12, at 232-33 (describing how, in Weber's view, the inner
logic of the scientific worldview led to the view's autonomy as its own intellectual sphere).
25 See Luckmann, supra note 1, at 134-35.
26 The idea of the evolution of distinct and autonomous intellectual and vocational
spheres is developed in great detail in Weber's famous works concerning science and politics. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, Politicsas a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
77-127 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Routledge 1991) (1948) [hereinafter
WEBER, ESSAYs]; WEBER, supra note 11, at 276-304. For a discussion, see Kennedy, supra note
7, at 1060.
27 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1058. On the legal mode of domination characterizing western modernity, see Trubek, supra note 16, at 731-39. The famous "iron cage of
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Yet, alongside the growing disenchantment, rationalization, and
bureaucratization, and alongside the "iron cage of modernity" narrative, there exists an opposing Weberian narrative. In this account of
occidental modernity, there always lurks the possibility of the emergence of the irrational, the mystical, the undecided, and the transcendental. 28 The stronger the grip of the disenchanting processes is on a
certain domain, the more resistance develops within that domain. 29
This "flight into the irrational"30 -an insistence that mystical and nonrational forms of knowledge exist-is the source of the development
of "sects" that resist the formal and rational dogmas of their respective
domains.3 1 Although this aspect of Weber's sociology is sometimes
marginalized, it too is central to his analysis of the process of the disenchantment of the world and of the uniqueness of Western
development.3 2
B.

The Disenchantment of Law

In the context of the legalfield, disenchantment therefore means,
first of all, the growing detachment of law from religion, both in lawAlmaking and in adjudication (which Weber calls "lawfinding").
many
place
over
took
of
disenchantment
the
process
though in law
centuries, this Essay concerns developments that happened after the
nineteenth century-when this process reached its peak, at least in
continental Europe.3 4 Positivism is the theory that most clearly
manifests this idea: law is not developed through divine revelation nor
modernity" was extremely influential on the development of Michel Foucault's idea of
"power/knowledge" and the emergence of disciplinary power. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DisCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books
1977) (1975); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et
al. trans., Pantheon Books 1980) (1972).
28 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1061-63.
29 See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 889 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
30 Id.
31 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1057-58.
32 Kennedy emphasizes this point. For him, the main tension within Weber's work
lies in the opposition between the "iron cage of modernity" narrative, which implies that
agents within each sphere are truly bound by formal rationality and cannot bona fide refuse to apply it mechanically, and the irrational/decisionist narrative, which suggests that
"all bureaucrats would have the possibility of agency within their jobs, rather than being
condemned to vocational formalism." See id. at 1055, 1061-69.
33
2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 880-95; see also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1039, 1059,
1064 (describing Weber's notion of "lawfinding"); David M. Trubek, Reconstructing Max
Weber's Sociology of Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 919, 925-33 (1985) (reviewing ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983)).
34 In his "sociology of law," Weber describes evolutions and developments in law and
legal theory, which span from antiquity until the early twentieth century. See 2 WEBER,
supra note 29, at 641-900.
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is it revealed by an oracle or any other prophetic form. 3 5 And the
gradual process of disenchantment further rejected even natural law
theory, according to which law is the unfolding of "reason."3 6 Rather,
what gives law legitimacy is that a formally authorized entity enacts
it. 7 And law collapses into politics because it is understood as the
pragmatic compromise between competing groups and interests.3 8
Adjudication, too, is disenchanted: the application of the laws-legislatively postulated-is not performed by "wise men" whose authority
stems from their charisma or ability to execute religious rites such as
the ordeal or trial by fire. Rather, it is a rational operation performed
by judges whose authority derives from a clear and positive
authorization.39
Initially, disenchantment produces three important consequences in the legal field: the divinely revealed laws lose their power
and legitimacy; divinely authorized traditional authorities (such as the
king) lose their legitimate power to give commands; 40 and divinely
authorized judges lose their legitimacy to adjudicate concrete disputes
and to apply the laws. 4 1 As the processes of rationalization and
35 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1046 (defining positivism as the "view that lawmaking
is a secular process through which a state claiming the monopoly of the legitimate exercise
of force enacts valid legal norms as compromises of conflicting interests").
36
See 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 873-75; see also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1048
(describing the disintegration of natural law).
37 See 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 865-76.
38
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1048, 1064. As Weber puts it:
The disappearance of the old natural law conceptions has destroyed all possibility of providing the law with a metaphysical dignity by virtue of its immanent qualities. In the great majority of its most important provisions, it
has been unmasked all too visibly, indeed, as the product or the technical
means of a compromise between conflicting interests.
2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 874-75. It is important to note that in this paragraph Weber is
not suggesting that lawyers who operate in a formal rational legal system are political actors; on the contrary, Weber argues that actors within a formal legal system are merely
applying law, regardless of its substantive content or its "political" consequences or intentions. Law collapses into politics, therefore, in the sense that legislation is understood as a
compromise between competing interests and groups that the political branch-the legislator-undertakes, not as the elaborated articulation of "reason" or as the revelation of
divine law. See id.
39
On the possibility that lawyers (and judges) are performing "practical wisdom" that
is neither technical nor magical but instead an endeavor committed to the idea that the
law is aspirational and manifesting normative ideals (since it is legislated through political
compromise and has political implications), see infra Part II.D.1.
40
See 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 1057. On classical legal thought, see DUNcAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLAssIcAL LEGAL THOUGHT 3 (Beard Books 2006) (1975)

(describing classical legal thought as a "way of thinking [that] amounted to a rationalistic
ordering of the whole legal universe"); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1, 6 (1983) (defining five major traits that legal systems possessed according to classical legal thought: comprehensiveness, completeness, formality, conceptual order, and
acceptability).
41 Weber calls this process the "substantive rationalization of sacred law." 2 WEBER,
supra note 29, at 815-31.
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bureaucratization continued, however, all previous forms of lawmaking and lawfinding (adjudication), including natural law, lost their legitimating force, and formal legal rationality took over. This school,
known in the United States as "classical legal thought," assumes that
the application of norms in concrete cases is completed through a
logical deduction of specific norms in light of the entire legal

system. 4 2
For Weber, formal legal rationality symbolized the height of this
disenchantment process, as it manifests a detachment from substantive value judgments; is based on general rules rather than on ad hoc
assessments; and strips the adjudication process (as well as lawmaking) from any remains of sacredness, magic, and charismatic authority. 4 3 American legal realism and its European variants (the German
free-law movement,"4 Scandinavian realism, 45 and the social jurists46 ),
which were already highly influential when Weber was writing about
the legal sphere, seemed to him to be only partially disenchanted,
somewhat primitive modes of legal reasoning, to be superseded by formal legal rationality.4 7 This was the case because these legal movements advocated the application of substantive rationality and ad hoc
considerations in adjudication. 48 Weber regarded such considerations as irrational and a form of premodern biased kadi justice, bound
to give way to the inevitable process of disenchantment and to the
domination of formal legal rationality.4 9
In retrospect, however, Weber might have been wrong in his prediction, or at least it remains an unresolved question, since realism
outlived formalism.50 If one looks at elite legal academic discourse in
the United States and some U.S.-influenced jurisdictions, legal realism
and policy analysis, rather than formal legal rationality, seem to have
prevailed as the preferred mode of legal reasoning in the second half
42

See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1057.
See id. at 1040-41.
4
On the German "free law movement" see James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The
German FreeLaw Movement as the Source ofAmerican Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REv. 399, 407-19
(1987).
45 See Heikki Pihlajamaki, Against Metaphysics in Law: The HistoricalBackgroundofAmerican and Scandinavian Legal Realism Compared, 52 AM. J. Comp. L. 469, 474-75 (2004).
46 These social jurists included Rudolf von Jhering, Otto von Gierke, Eugen Ehrlich,
Francois Giny, and others. See id. at 474-75. On the social jurists and Weber's critique of
them, see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1049-50, 1052-55.
47
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1054-55.
48
See 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 815-30; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1071-76.
49
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1053-54.
50
Hence the famous, almost clich6 saying, "we are all realists now." See LAuRA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 229 (1986); see also Hanoch Dagan, The Realist
Conception of Law, 57 U. ToRoro L.J. 607, 610 (2007).
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of the twentieth century.5 ' This development can be understood not
as a withdrawal from disenchantment to a premodern mode of legal
reasoning or as a "flight into the irrational." Rather, realist-inspired
theories-e.g., critical legal studies, law and economics, legal feminism, law and society-should be seen as thoroughly disenchanted,
adhering to secularist, positivist, and rationalist conceptions of law.
They deny law's unity, ahistorical essence, or transcendental meaning.
In this sense, they are far more disenchanted than the formal legal
rationality that Weber hailed as the apex of legal disenchantment. As
Duncan Kennedy points out:
The critique of [legal formal rationality] disenchants it because it
deprives the decision maker of the illusion .

.

. that 'the system' in

some sense produces the norms that decide cases, rather than either some particular earlier jurist enunciating some particular rule,
or we ourselves imposing meaning in the presence of a gap .... .2
Legal realism and its descendents disenchant law because they take
the themes of loss of unity and loss of meaning to their radical conclusion: not only is "the world" disenchanted and fragmented but also
the legal domain is broken into "small" (or narrower) doctrinal areas,
case-specific principles, and "situated" legal categories.5 3 And not
only does "the world" lose its systemic structure due to the loss of a
divine, external, transcendental meaning, the law, too, is stripped of
its systemic coherence and metaphysical underpinnings because its
enactment had been unmasked as a product of political compromise
between competing interests and groups,5 4 and its concrete articula51

See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in

THE NEW LAW AND EcONOmic DEVELOPMENT 19, 21, 63-71 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro

Santos eds., 2006) (describing three periods of the "globalization of legal thought" and
particularly the last globalization, in which American policy analysis has disseminated
throughout the globe); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465,
467-68 (1988) (reviewing LAuRA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
Alongside the triumph of legal realism and policy analysis in elite law schools, large portions of legal practitioners in the United States remained committed to a fairly formalistic
mode of legal reasoning. It is indeed a question whether policy analysis-an accepted
practice-is dominant or marginal outside the elite of law schools, judiciary, and the bar.
And outside the United States, in continental Europe (especially in Germany and France),
Asia, Latin America, and other European-influenced countries, formal rationality remained a favorable mode of legal reasoning, even in elite law schools, until very recently.
52
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1068.
53
The need to create concrete, "smaller," and situation-sensitive legal categories and
rules that will replace the broad and abstract concepts and categories was a major theme
that legal realists developed. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1237 (1931). Indeed, as Dagan points out,
the fragmentation of the legal field by no means unveils its political nature. In various
normative discussions, it merely indicates the need to adapt the law to needs and interests,
which require case or situation sensitivity, hence breaking down overly broad categories
into narrower ones. See Dagan, supra note 50, at 647-51.
54
2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 874-75.
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tion, execution, and interpretation is a result of an infinite number of
decisions taken by administrators and judges, not of philosophical
contemplation or metaphysical meaning.5 5
For the purposes of this discussion, I will leave aside the question
whether judges, "legal scientists," and other legal actors in the period
of classical legal thought-nineteenth-century formal legal rationality-were actually "enchanted" according to Weber since they were in
denial of the fact that they were constantly making decisions and
choices, experiencing them as mandated and coerced by "the system."
Although Weber clearly refers to such a mode of operation as "disenchanted," thus supposedly denying the possibility that formalist
judges and jurists were in fact enchanted, his arguments about the
"decisionist" element inherent in human action-that within each
sphere of activity (law, economics, and so forth), formal rationality
runs out and actors are faced with the need to decide without any
guiding rules-point in the opposite direction as well: disenchantment actually means a loss of faith in formal rationality, and therefore
the height of disenchantment is the decisionist moment. According
to this alternative Weberian narrative, the denial of choice and deci56
sion within legal operations amounts to enchantment.
Despite Weber's influence on twentieth-century sociology and on
some prominent legal theorists,5 7 over the twentieth century, disenchantment, rationalization, secularization, and even bureaucratization never became the organizing themes around which the
important jurisprudential debates revolved. Starting with American
legal realism, the two interlinked problems which scholars dealt with
and fought over concerned the indeterminacy of adjudication and the
power (or violence) that the law exerted over its subjects.58 The responses to these two challenges, which the legal realists opened up,
solidified two agonistic camps: on one side, critical theories that
55 See Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUm. L.
REv. 809, 809-21 (1935) (critiquing the "transcendental" and metaphysical mode of legal
reasoning, as opposed to the realist, functional mode).
56 Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1061-62.
57 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAx WEBER (1983); Sally Ewing, Formaljusticeand
the Spirit of Capitalism:Max Weber's Sociology of Law, 21 LAw & Soc. REV. 487 (1987); Trubek,
supra note 16; Trubek, supra note 33.
58 See Singer, supra note 51, at 470-503. 1 do not suggest that the realists did not
proffer an impressive, perhaps even convincing, attempt to deal with these challenges by
themselves. Nor am I suggesting that the realists' legal conception denied the possibility of
all normativity; on the contrary, alongside their critique, the realists paved the way for what
could be called a "disenchanted reconstruction/normativity." Indeed, they offered a wide
array of reconstructive suggestions to their critique of legal formalism, most notably the
social-scientific response-law's indeterminacy can be resolved through the application of
social science to legal questions-and the practical reason/wisdom response-legal actors
neither merely apply the law nor exert crude power but work within this tension by applying practical wisdom. See Dagan, supra note 50, at 652.
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stressed the indeterminacy and fluidity of legal rules and concepts
that skeptically viewed the ability to adjudicate neutrally and objectively and worried about the power and domination in which the law
was implicated;59 and on the other side, reconstructivist theories that
aimed to rehabilitate the legitimacy of adjudication by emphasizing
that judges are bound by objective constraints and by offering various
means that might curb judicial power and discretion.6 0
A growing number of important contemporary jurisprudential
debates, I argue, sidestep these century-old conflicts and, even without
explicitly using the terminology of dis- and reenchantment, return to
the constitutive moment of the emergence of legal realism to resurrect the possibility of an enchanted law. This circumstance is somewhat ironic because, as I have shown before, the theory that preceded
legal realism-classical legal thought or formal legal rationality-was,
at least in Weber's terms, a thoroughly disenchanted legal theory.6 1
As a matter of the present, however, it matters less what formalism's
exact content was earlier in the twentieth century; it is far more important to consider its historical lineage and genealogy, its current use
and articulation, and its future trajectory. As I demonstrate, contemporary antirealists are less interested in resisting the rehashed themes
regarding law's indeterminacy and power-the familiar legal-realist
challenges. Rather, they are offering the idea that there is "more" to
law than its instrumentality, power, and distributive impact.6 2 This insistence on "more," I argue, lies at the heart of legal reenchantment.
In the next Part, I map some of the various reenchanting legal
theories.

59
See Singer, supra note 51, at 469-70. Giving a comprehensive list of various critical
legal theories would be impossible. The leading ones, however, are: critical legal studies,
critical race theory, (critical) law and society, some strands of legal feminism, and critical
legal history. For a comprehensive overview of the critical legal projects, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997). See also LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (reviewing the state of the art of critical legal projects).
60
See Singer, supra note 51, at 470-71. More difficult than listing all the critical theories is naming all the legal-reconstruction projects and theoreticians. Those most dominant and influential are: the legal process, law and economics, normative legal feminism
(also referred to as governance feminism, see JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND
WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006)), normative law and society, legal formalism,
and empirical legal studies.
61
See supra Part I.B.
62
As I elaborate in the following section, this "more" is quite different for different
theoreticians: law is immanently rational, see infra Part IIA.; a mode for expressing and
inculcating virtue, see infta Part II.B.; a form of art, see infra Part II.C.; or charismatically
authoritative, see infra Part II.D.

644

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:633

II
THE REENCHANTMENT OF LAW

When I talk about reenchantment or reenchanting theories, I primarily mean that at this point of American jurisprudence, legal theoreticians are developing and using themes and ideas that oppose
disenchanted law and try to resist law's instrumentality, fragmentation, and loss of transcendental meaning.6 3 Some do so explicitly and
overtly, while others are more covert about their reenchanting tendencies. Although the rejection of disenchanting themes is central to
some theories, for others it is an undesirable-though perhaps unavoidable-side effect. Interestingly, none of these theorists-even
those that are openly rejecting the traits of the law associated with the
disenchanted view of it-calls himself a "reenchanter." And although
some might not oppose that title, others might find it surprising, if
not offensive.
In the following subparts, I mostly discuss theoreticians who develop reenchanting themes as either an explicit or a hidden, yet central, component of their conception of the law. I also briefly analyze
theoreticians who would vehemently object to their characterization
as reenchanters yet whose theory, to my mind, produces an unintentional reenchanting "supplement." It is therefore my goal to tease out
reenchantment threads-explicit, implicit, and unintended-and
show how they connect seemingly distinct theoretical endeavors
under the umbrella of legal reenchantment. Hence, sometimes I
point to reenchanting themes that are a direct presentation of the
writers, while in other cases I discuss the theories critically, teasing out
hidden-or even denied-reenchanting tendencies that they include. 64 The four reenchantments that I discuss below are by no
means exhaustive of the reenchantment of law that I aim to expose in
this Essay. Indeed, there are more schools of legal thought that
should be read, in my mind, as exemplifying this new mode of legal

63 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-75 (1986) (charismatization of legal
authorities); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLTICAL DisCOURSE 1-17 (1991) (virtue); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
104-09 (1982) (morality); Philippe Nonet, In Praiseof Callicles, 74 IowA L. REv. 807 (1989)
[hereinafter Nonet, In Praiseof Callicles] (law as art); Philippe Nonet, In the Matter ofGreen
v. Recht, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 363 (1987) [hereinafter Nonet, Green v. Recht] (law as a form
of art); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949 (1988) (legal formalism).
64 In this sense, my argument is hermeneutic rather than empirical or positive, as I
offer a new interpretative framework for a significant volume of scholarly works. I do not
claim to have discovered any new data or facts, but merely suggest that the set of works that
I discuss are best read in light of the conceptual framework that I offer.
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thought, and which merit a more detailed discussion than this Essay
provides. 65
A.

The Reenchantment of Formalism

A particularly interesting development in contemporary legal
scholarship is the resurgence of formalism as a legal theory. Since the
late 1980s, the writings of Ernest Weinrib 66 have spurred and inspired
a renewed interest in legal formalism and managed to reintroduce
conceptual discussions into legal theory.67 Weinrib's position might
have been considered almost heretical or incomprehensible when he
first began articulating it.68 Yet, over time his position grew popular

in various academic circles and made a significant impact on contemporary legal theory. In areas such as torts, contract, property, criminal
law, constitutional law, and family law, 69 scholars have reworked their
fields to demonstrate that such areas can be understood-indeed
65
One such major strand of legal thought includes scholars influenced by the writings of political theologians such as Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and
Giorgio Agamben. These philosophers, in distinct ways, advance the idea that modernity
still carries remnants of the theological and of theological modes of reasoning. For legal
scholars working in that vein, there is a formidable task to uncover, as Lavi points out, "the
sacred past or a transcendent future that lurk beneath the surface of rational-secularized
law." See Shai Lavi, Enchantinga Disenchanted Law: On theJewish Ritual and Secular History in
Nineteenth Century Germany, 1 U. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). Some such legal writers unveil law's profound theological structure and content in order to reenchant it and
find in it the metaphysical, the divine, and the ideal. See, e.g., Lior Barshack, Constituent
Poweras Body: Outline of a Constitutional Theology, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 185 (2006); Lior Barshack, Notes on the ClericalBody of the Law, 24 CARDozo L. REV. 1151 (2003); Chris Tomlins,
Toward a Materialistjurisprudence,in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY. LAW,
IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS (Alfred Brophy & Daniel Hamilton eds., forthcoming 2011).
66
See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw (1995) [hereinafter
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAw] (discussing formalism as a means of understanding private law);
Weinrib, supra note 63 (defending legal formalism); ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Jurisprudenceof
Legal Formalism, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583 (1993) [hereinafter Weinrib,Jurisprudence]
(refuting the notion that formalism is dead).
67
See, e.g., ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL
JUSTICE 28-58 (2009) (arguing that, despite its limits, formalism is a necessary framework
for interpreting and developing a liberal theory of penal justice); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAw (1997) (developing a formalist-inspired conception of property law); ATHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 287-95,
314-18 (2009) (defending the notions of formal equality and formal wrongdoing).
68
For example, Weinrib writes: "Formalism is like a heresy driven underground,
whose tenets must be surmised from the derogatory comments of its detractors." Weinrib,
supra note 63, at 950.
69
The list is lengthy and includes BRUDNER, supra note 67, at 28-48 (criminal law,
constitutional law); PENNER, supra note 67, at 103-04 (property); RiPsrEIN, supra note 67, at
30-56 (contracts, property, constitutional law, criminal law); WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAw, supra
note 66, at 23-55 (torts); ErnestJ. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 795, 800-01 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib, Kant's System of Rights]
(property); ErnestJ. Weinrib, Restoring Restitution, 91 VA. L. REV. 861, 862-63 (2005) [hereinafter Weinrib, Restoring Restitution] (reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAw AND ETHICS OF
RESTITUTION (2004)) (restitution).
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ought to be understood-as "immanently intelligible normative practice[s]," "social arrangement[s] responsive to moral argument,"70 coherent and unified articulations of "juridical relationships in a
sophisticated legal system,"7 1 and, crucially, autonomous vis-a-vis
72
politics.
But it seems surprising-not to say contradictory-that I refer to
formalism as a mode of reenchantment. The surprise comes from the
fact that in Weber's sociology of law, as we have seen earlier, formal
legal rationality represents the height of the rationalization and
bureaucratization of the legal system and, hence, its utmost disenchantment.7 3 Indeed, contemporary formalism looks, at least at
first glance, as if it adheres to Weber's characterization of disenchantment. It insists that the law is a domain enclosed within itself (immanence), operating according to its own distinct rationality, in which
justification is made according to internal juridical concepts, with special attention given to rules and principles that were developed within
the legal field.74 And like Weber's depiction of disenchanted formal
rationality, contemporary formalism stresses the necessity of formrather than a specific content-to the legal justificatory process.7 5
Yet upon closer examination, and paradoxical as it may sound,
current formalism is reenchanted. First, it is radically ahistorical and
essentialist in the sense that it seeks "the essential characteristics of
juridical relationships," 76 which largely are fixed over time and cultures. The return of contemporary formalists to philosophers such as
Kant (Weinrib7 7 and Ripstein 78 ), Hegel (Brudner7 9 ), Aquinas
(Weinrib8 0 ), and Aristotle (Weinrib8 ) is crucial to the formalist move
because it proves, they claim, the profound and inescapable truth of
the formal nature of law. In Weber's terms, however, formal legal rationality is historical through and through. It is a stage in the evolution of legal modes of justification and legitimization. And although
Weber made no attempt to predict what will follow it, formality was
70

71
72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Weinrib, Jurisprudence,supra note 66, at 583.
Weinrib, supra note 63, at 966.
See id. at 973, 985-99.
See supra Part I.B.
See Weinrib, supra note 63, at 952-55.
See id. at 962-63, 966-84.
See id. at 966.
See, e.g., Weinrib, Kant's System of Rights, supra note 69, at 795-828.
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 67, at 1-30.
See BRUDNER, supra note 67, at 34-35, 45-48, 231-32; Brudner, supra note 9, at

1183-98.
80 See Weinrib, supra note 63, at 954 n.14 (citing Aquinas as the "classic account" of
formalism).
81
See id. at 977-81 (noting that Aristotle was the first to describe juridical abstractions
in his discussion of justice).
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not an eternal essence or characteristic of legal systems. 82 The timelessness and essentialism that current formalism advances colors law
in magical and traditional shades. They depict law not only as an
ideality-rather than a reality-but also as an eternal ideal, which was
already revealed to the ancients (Aristotle and Aquinas).
Second, despite its claim to deal with the forms of legal justifications, contemporary formalism is far more ambitious and substantive.
Disenchanted formalism was formalistic in a stricter sense. In Weber's
depiction, legal forms were truly vacuous; it was crucial for the process
of disenchantment that whatever specific content the legislator decided upon could fit into the formal legal system, which was operated
mechanically and logically by administrators and judges.8 3 But, for
formalists such as Weinrib, Ripstein, Brudner, 84 and Penner, the legal
forms are extremely rich, thick, and full of content. From the legal
forms, they extract and imply-objectively, rationally, and apolitically-which standard of liability should be adopted,8 5 what level of
protection private property should receive,8 6 what acts should be
criminalized,8 7 what remedies should be given for breach of contract,8 8 and more. Upon closer examination, the substance that is imbuing the forms with their concrete meaning and content is freedom, as
understood and interpreted by some contemporary formalists.8 9
Hence, current formalism is a reenchanted legal theory-not only because it is in fact substantive (for Weber, this was a mark of a primitive
and enchanted legal system) but also because the concrete content is
determined through an elaboration of metaphysical assumptions
about the essence of the human subject, human relations, and the
meaning of "freedom." That every norm can be traced back to
profound ideals about morality and humanity is indeed the opposite
of the disenchanted vision that sees legal norms as the product of political compromise (or its technical application).9o
82 The profound historicity of legal formalism is obvious in Weber's sociology of law
because all modes of legal thought are historical and change over time.
83 Weber claimed that legal positivism was an essential part of the evolution of legal
disenchantment because it meant that no matter what the legislator determined, the legal
system would be able to work it into an elaborate system of rules, bureaucratically applied.
2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 875-76.
84 See BRUDNER, supra note 67, at 21-55. Although Brudner claims that formalism has
limits and that a full normative account requires considerations of morality and policy, he
generally accepts formalism as a necessary framework for legal theory. See id.
85
See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAw, supra note 66.
86
See PENNER, supra note 67.
87

See BRUDNER, supra note 67.

88 See Weinrib, Restoring Restitution, supra note 69.
89 I refer here especially to Ripstein and Brudner, who are explicit about their commitment to freedom as the titles of their books suggest: for Ripstein it is Force and Freedom
and for Brudner Punishment and Freedom.
90 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1064.
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Before I move to the third point, I would like to clarify that the
reason I refer to contemporary formalists as reenchanters is not just
their normativity-that is, their attempt to direct the law in various
desirable directions-or their mere insistence that the law serves as a
reservoir for various ideals and values, some of which come from morality. In this sense (almost) all legal theories are normative, and to
name all of them "reenchanting" would render this Essay superfluous.
What is unique-and reenchanting-about the normativity of the formalists is that it is essentialist, ahistorical, and dependent on highly
conceptual and metaphysical reasoning, feeding on monistic morality
rather than consequences, effects, or realities.
This brings me to the third point, which is the centrality of philosophical contemplation regarding the law-especially Kant's and
Hegel's (but also Aristotle's and Aquinas's) -in contemporary formalism. This centrality embodies the strange twist that formalists give to
the notion of law's autonomy and immanence-a twist that is a mark
of formalism's reenchantment because, to my mind, it means that
contemporary formalism is neither immanent nor truly autonomous
despite the declared presentation by its advocates. Although the underlying claim exists that legal justification must be free from external
influences such as economics, psychology, and "politics," both morality and philosophy-also extralegal domains-clearly impact the legal
domain.9 1 Its proponents do not articulate this influence as "invasion" or as a direct interference with law's autonomy. It is also not
presented as law's submission to some transcendental meaning but as
law's necessary "responsiveness" to moral arguments. 9 2 Indeed, at
least Weinrib would vehemently deny that moral or philosophical considerations have independent weight and would insist that philosophy
only serves as the framework that defines the limits of law-not its
concrete forms or content. However, Brudner and Ripstein admit
that philosophy (or morality) has an independent significance in determining concrete rules and principles, and convincing readings of
Weinrib suggest that he too bases specific norms and principles on
fairly thick metaphysical ideas regarding the nature of the individual
and of intersubjective interactions.9 3 And when compared with other
91
See, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra note 67, at 255 ("Kant is certainly committed to the idea
that 'right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right.'").
92
The problem of law's special relation to morality is obviously one of the themes
that twentieth-century jurisprudence deals with most extensively (even more so over the
past thirty years) and is not unique to contemporary formalism. Indeed I argue that the
renewed interest in natural law and in law's morality is another marker of the reenchantment of law. See infra Part II.B.
93
Some have therefore argued that Weinrib's formalism is reminiscent of natural law.
See George Brencher IV, Formalism,Positivism, and NaturalLaw in Ernest Weinrib's Tort Theory:
Will the Real Ernest Weinib Please Come Forward?,42 U. ToRoro L.J. 318, 350 (1992).
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normative legal efforts, what is distinct-and reenchanted-about the
formalist use of philosophical contemplation is that it takes primacy
over any other consideration in determining legal rules and principles. Thus law becomes a purely ideal realm-an otherworldly domain devoid of any realistic considerations.
Fourth, disenchanted legal formality, in Weber's articulation, actually relied upon the collapse of legislation into politics rather than
on their strict separation 94 (which current formalists hail9 5 ). Stripped
of its divine legitimacy and any other traditional charisma, disenchanted law is understood to be fully man-made. Even natural law
theories lost their legitimating power along the process of disenchantment, Weber claims, and law was "unmasked .

.

. [as] the technical

means of a compromise between conflicting interests."9 6 This disenchanting realization is therefore closely linked with the realist understanding that law (over which the legislators fight and reach
compromises) is a means for achieving social ends. Current formalist
refusal to consider these "political" and "instrumental" aspects of the
law-indeed their vehement rejection as threatening the true essence
of the law-is what leaves the legal domain as an enchanted sphere
equivalent to love, as Weinrib claims: "Explaining love in terms of extrinsic ends is necessarily a mistake, because love does not shine in our
lives with the borrowed light of an extrinsic end. Love is its own end.
My contention is that, in this respect, private law is just like love."97
Although Weinrib only means to point to the intrinsicvalue of private
law-and to deny it being an instrument to achieve social goals-it is
extremely telling that he compares law to love. In Weber's analysis, in
our disenchanted epoch, the domains of love (or intimacy and eroticism) and art take the place of religion in leaving room for experiences of revelation, salvation, and magic.98 To turn law into love is
indeed to reenchant it, to reinscribe the magical, the mystical, and the
prophetic into a domain that has become rationalized, bureaucratized, and instrumentalized to its core.

94 See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1064 ("Weber's theory of the disenchantment of lawmaking ended with its fusion into politics-specifically legislative politics.").
95 See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 63, at 985-99.
96
2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 874-75.
97
See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAw, supra note 66, at 6.
98
"It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental, nor is it
accidental that today only within the smallest and intimate circles, in personal human situations, in pianissimo, that something is pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma,
which in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them
together." MAX WEBER, The Origins of Modern Capitalism, in SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS 151,
155 (Wolf Heydebrand ed., Frank H. Knight trans., 1994).
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Last, contemporary formalism manifests what Schlag calls an "enchantment of reason."9 9 Coming after a hundred years during which
reason's objectivity and deductivity has been severely challenged (if
not shattered altogether), and during which reason's ability to produce legal principles, rules, and concrete outcomes in cases from
highly abstract ideas (such as "freedom," "liberty," "dignity," "personality," "property," and the like) has been delegitimated in the legal
sphere, it seems almost magical to put faith in reason to do just that.
Indeed, it requires a leap of faith, a forgetting of so much that had
been written and taught, and an ignorance of evidence that demonstrates reason's vulnerability. This is not to say that such leap of faith
is unfruitful, nor does it mean that such an act of belief is not required by the high aspirations that some of us might share. It means,
however, that "philosophical reason," which is being used by current
formalists-those influenced by Kant's and Hegel's writing, in particular-is not performing the same disenchanting function that it did
when it was originally articulated (by Kant and Hegel, who both secularized law and stripped it of its magic and religiosity). Indeed, it is
not their sheer Kantianism or Hegelianism that renders the formalists
reenchanters; it is the fact that they utilize these philosophical traditions to regain faith in procedures and institutions that were debunked throughout the twentieth century as plagued by subjectivity,
arbitrariness, and ideology unless a thorough pragmatic, realist critique was placed upon "reason." The formalist return to this discredited "reason" is therefore a reenchantment of the legal field that was
stripped of its "metaphysical dignity." 0 0
B.

The Reenchantment of Virtue

Over the past few decades, we have witnessed the resurgence of
"virtue" in political theory as well as in legal theory.1 0 1 Writers from
the right, left, and center-often associated with Catholic thought99 See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 1 (1998). In a book review, Kennedy identifies four different meanings of the phrase enchantment of reason in Schlag's theorization: first, an immoderate confidence, an excessive belief in one's own reason; second,
the rule of reason; third, denying reason's vulnerability; and fourth, "'an odd conjunction
of the magical and the technological' in thinking about law." See Duncan Kennedy, Pierre
Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513, 516-39 (2003).
100 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 874-75.
10] Classical works advocating the need to reinsert virtue into our political and legal
systems include PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHy 1-19 (1978); GLENDON, supra note 63, at 1-17; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 210-46 (1981); SANDEL, supra note 63, at 104-09; Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in 13 MIDWEsT STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHrY
ETHicAL THEORY 32, 32-34 (Peter A. French et al. eds, 1988). Bonnie Honig argues that
contemporary-virtue theorists (such asJohn Rawls and Michael Sandel) use the concept of
"virtue" to quench real politics, which is about irresolvable contests and disagreements. See
BONNIE HONIG, POuTICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF Pouncs 126-213 (1993).
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have begun arguing that our legal order needs to be responsive to and
advance the inculcation of various personal virtues. 0 2 Such theories
aim to bring back "character" (not the real or concrete character but
the ideal character) into legal discussions 0 3 and to offer "a substantive conception of the human good or flourishing ... [and] to answer
the questions 'What sort of person should I be?' and 'How will a particular course of action guide me toward or away from becoming that
sort of person?" 0 4 Virtue-centered jurisprudence hence asks how
can the law help in making citizens virtuous.1 0 5 Although much of the
writing in this vein relies on Aristotle and the Greeks, 0 6 this group
does not include only neo-Aristotelians. As Martha Nussbaum notes,
virtue theorists should not be seen as offering a third position which
opposes both Kantianism and utilitarianism, since both Kant and the
British utilitarians were in fact deeply concerned with virtue and developed a theory of it.107 When I refer to legal-virtue theorists, therefore, I do not mean to exclude some scholars who are actually
interested in Kant's or Hegel's theory of virtue (such as Weinrib, 08
Brudner,109 or Ripsteino1 0 ).
Although earlier discourse on virtue was a predominantly-and
almost exclusively-religious (Catholic) project and was therefore
mostly the business of expressly religious scholars and published in
religious-oriented law reviews, such discourse has recently penetrated
mainstream academic discussions in doctrinal fields such as property
law, environmental issues, contracts, torts, and criminal law.''
102

See, e.g., Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94

CORNELL

L. REv. 821, 860-87

(2009).
103
See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 179 (2003) (arguing for a "virtue-centered theory ofjudging," which
looks to encourage certain desirable characteristics of judges and which can account for
the role that judges play in the legal system). It is important to distinguish the interest that
virtue theorists find in "character" and the attention that legal realists' interest gave to the
concrete character of legal actors, especially judges. While for virtue theorists character is
an object of interest due to the importance of intentions to the evaluation of the actions
(and therefore it is important thatjudges, for example, would have an ideal character), see
id., for realists the investigation of the character of judges was necessary to predict what
they might do in a specific dispute.
104
See Pefialver, supra note 102, at 864.
105 See Solum, supra note 103, at 181 ("Virtue ethics has implications for an account of
the proper ends of legislation. If the aim of law is to make citizens virtuous . . . , what are
the implications for the content of the laws?").
106 See, e.g., Peialver, supra note 102, at 863-64 (reintroducing the Aristotelian ethical
tradition into the study of property and land use).
107 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?, 3 J. ETHICS 163,
164-67 (1999).
108 See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 63, at 977 n.8.
109
See, e.g., BRUDNER, supra note 67, at 26.
110 See, e.g., id. at 1-30.
III See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another. Preliminary Thoughts on Civility,
Moral Character,and Professionalism,8 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 113, 113 (1995) ("The practice of
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The current quest for virtue in law occupies a special oppositional
spot vis-21-vis the disenchanted vision of the legal domain, as an action
is made virtuous not due to its conformity to rules or principles;
rather, "[a] n action is virtuous because it is the sort of action a virtuous person undertakes ....

The category of virtuous conduct . .. goes

well beyond the range of behavior that mechanical rules can adequately describe and calls for the skillful exercise ofjudgment guided
12
by practical wisdom."'
I will now explain on what account virtue theory is reenchanting
law, but before that I would like to clarify that, as with my analysis of
contemporary formalism, it is not my intention to point to the errors
of, or problems with, virtue theory in law. Indeed, I expect that more
and more jurisprudential attention will be given to examining the
pros and cons of such approach and that scholarly works will be dedicated to working out the ways in which virtue should and could (or
should not and could not) occupy a larger space in the law. My aim,
therefore, is to show that virtue theory and the responses it might provoke displace the realist debates regarding law's indeterminacy and
power with questions that belong to a reenchanted legal realm. Such
questions and responses include-rather than exclude-metaphysical
and idealist pondering about issues of character, the human, and the
good.
The first reenchanting element is, thus, that virtue theories are
overtly and explicitly seeking legal meaning and substantive content
of norms by recourse to a transcendental domain-a metaphysical
idea about the "well-lived life" or what "human flourishing" might
mean.' 1 3 Needless to say, if the law is always geared toward such goals,
law as a profession presupposes a commitment to civility in rational discourse."); Robert
John Araujo, justice as Right Relationship: A Philosophicaland Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 377, 378-79 (2002) (using theories of virtue in assessing the
role ofjustice in legal, political, and human history); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82
CAUF. L. REv. 329, 378-86 (1994) (using Aristotle's theory of virtue to defend the argument that communities must morally educate citizens to make politics more deliberative);
Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 Mica. L. REv. 983,
987, 1012 (1990) (arguing that America's problem of a "permanent underclass" reflects a
failure of virtue); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1423, 1425
(1995) (premising his view of the criminal-justice system on Aristotle's theory that criminal
law serves the greater good of humanity by promoting virtue); David Lametti, The Concept of
Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth, 53 U. TORONro L.J. 325, 340 (2003)
(describing Western property regimes as exhibiting "some teleology of virtue"); Eduardo
M. Pefialver, supra note 102, at 862-87 (introducing virtue as an alternative to economic
land-use theory); Solum, supra note 103, at 178-79 (introducing a virtue-centered theory of
judging).
112 See Pefialver, supra note 102, at 865.
113 Pefialver includes most liberal values and virtues within a "fully developed conception of human flourishing" thus leaving the enormous task to balance between them at the
hands of the judge (as well as the administrator and even the landowner). See Pefialver,
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and if judges and other actors are expected to act in a manner that
reflects this almost-religious meaning, our law has once again been
infused with cosmic and transcendental meaning.
Second, given the complexity and substantive (as opposed to formal) nature of the work of the judge, we are further removed from
the disenchanted view of the judge and the administrator as bureau1 4 or
crats, managers, or scientists who either technically apply the lawH
fall onto some other field of knowledge (economics, for example)
that decides the case for them. Judges-virtuous judges, that is-are
required to be in possession of the most important virtue of all: practical wisdom, which enables them to take into account and balance the
various virtues that need to be inculcated and the different values that
need to be promoted.1 1 5 Thus, their authority is not a result of their
objective knowledge, positive authorization, unique institutional capacity, reasoned elaboration, or technical skills; rather, the judge's (or
the state administrator's) authority is a derivative of his or her character and wisdom or, to put it differently, personal charisma.116
Before I move to the next type of reenchanting theory, I want to
make the point that unlike contemporary formalists, at least some virtue theorists (such as Eduardo Pefialver) actually endorse-rather
than reject or totally ignore-the realist critique of indeterminacy and
power. Pefialver admits that "virtue theory[ ] lack[s] ... an algorithm
for social decision making," but he argues that "far from being a fatal
weakness, [it] is actually a point of strength."" 7 Rather than surrendering to the reconstructivist demand that a normative theory overcome conflicts and quench deliberation, Pefialver claims that
"[i]nstead of burying the tension among plural values inside homogenizing numerical measures of dubious validity, . . . virtue theory

brings that tension to the foreground and invites reasoned deliberation about an appropriate response to it.""* It is here, however, that
we can detect the reenchanting move of virtue theory: although economic analysis cannot truly solve law's indeterminacy (it is, argues
supra note 102, at 867-74, 869 n.197; see also Eduardo M. Pefialver, Restoring the Right Constitution, 116 YALE L.J. 732, 748 (2007) ("Drawing the appropriate limits around permissible
state action in the private sphere ultimately depends upon the consideration of the effectiveness of legal norms in particular contexts as well as the development of an adequate
account of human flourishing and the role of human freedom within that account.").
114
See, e.g., Mdximo Langer, The Rise of ManagerialJudgingin InternationalCriminalLaw,
53 Am. J. Comp. L. 835 (2005); Judith Resnik, Managerialjudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374
(1982) (describing the rise of "managerial judges" in U.S. civil procedures).
115
See Pefialver, supra note 102, at 865.
116 This is, to my mind, the crucial difference between virtue theory of adjudication
and an institutional theory such as the one developed by Owen Fiss. See also infra Part II.D
(discussing the reenchantment of legal authorities).
117
See Pefialver, supra note 102, at 876.
118

See id.
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Pefialver, largely an illusion that cost-benefit analysis provides determinacy),119 virtue largely solves the problem that lies behind law's indeterminacy, which is plurality of values. It does so through the
reasoned deliberation of charismatic decision makers who possess the
virtue of practical wisdom. It is true that Pefialver's position could
also be interpreted in a slightly less enchanted way; it is possible that
he merely suggests that given the indeterminacy of the system, virtue
provides an aspirational horizon rather a permanent solution. And
practical wisdom need not be necessarily construed as a magical virtue; it could be understood as a trait that any applier of rules must
possess, even in the most disenchanted system. 120
Despite these qualifications, reenchantment seems to be appearing in virtue theories of the law as an almost unwanted supplement of
irrationality (which in Weberian terms means ad hoc and substantive)
once the focus of the theory changes from rules, principles, procedures, and, most importantly, consequences and outcomes to evaluations of character, personality, and the meaning of "the good life."
C.

The Reenchantment of Law as Art

Perhaps the most vehemently anti-instrumentalist, antirealist approach to law-legal scholarship-and therefore, I will argue, a radically reenchanting one-was sparked by Philippe Nonet's writings.' 2 1
Cast as an assault on "law and . . . " scholarship, his famous In the

Matter of Green v. Recht began his profound contemplation on the
nature of modern law and legal theory, examining their state of affairs
as a manifestation of humanity's decline, self-defilement, and selfabasement. 2 2 Over the past twenty years, this approach-resisting
the term theory 2 3-gained much interest and support, and a group of
young scholars (mostly students of Nonet such as Marianne Consta-

1'9 See id. at 887.
120 Dagan advocates this position, according to which the realist conception of law is
based on judges applying practical wisdom in order to deal with the tensions inherent in
any legal system. See Dagan, supra note 50, at 644-45, 648, 652.
121 See, e.g., Nonet, Green v. Recht, supranote 63; Nonet, In Praiseof Callicles, supra note
63; Philippe Nonet, What Is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990) [hereinafter Nonet,
Positive Law]; Philippe Nonet, Sanction, 25 CumB. L. REV. 489 (1995); Philippe Nonet, Time
and Law, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 311 (2006).

122 See Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 375-77.
123 Lavi eloquently explains this resistance in his contribution to this issue. Theory, he
argues, suggests a perspective that is therefore already limited by the position of the observer. It is, he claims, part of the move to epistemology, which has given up on truly
knowing the object. See Shai Lavi, Turning the Tables on "Law and . . . ". A Jurisprudential
Inquiry into Contemporary Legal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 811 (2011).
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ble, 124 Roger Berkowitz, 1 2 5 Linda Ross Meyer, 126 Mark Antaki,'12 7 and
Shai Lavi' 28 ) ventured into studies in distinct fields of law such as
torts, criminal law, bioethics, international law, and more.
It is hard to capture the essence of, and the similarity between,
these scholarly works. Yet at their heart lies a complete rejection of
law's instrumentality and an insistence that the age of positive law and
the theories that accompany it is one of the darkest (if not the darkest)
moments in human history. It is tempting to refer to them as "metaphysical" studies of law, but they are far more specific than being
merely generally "metaphysical."1 2 9 These works share a very specific
metaphysical position, highly influenced by the writings of Friedrich
Nietzsche and of Martin Heidegger, lamenting modernity, fearing the
dangers which are implicit in it while also accepting it as unavoidable,
and perhaps even celebrating it.so The decline of law that these

scholars document, however, took place not in a matter of decades
but over many centuries (at least).1 31
In a way, this decline parallels law's disenchantment according to
Weber, but there is a change in emphasis and a catastrophic undertone (as compared with Weber's mild pessimism). While for Weber
disenchantment is a process of rationalization, secularization, and
bureaucratization that locks us in "the iron cage of modernity" and
enables economic growth and prosperity,132 for Nonet-following
Heidegger-it is a story of man's desertion by the gods and of human124

See MARIANNE

CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN

LAW 9-14 (2005); MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994) [hereinafter CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER]; Marianne Constable, Genealogy andjurisprudence:Nietzsche,

Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 551, 554-55 (1994).
125
See ROGER BERKOWITZ, THE Gwnr OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND THE MODERN LEGAL TRADITION 1-10 (2005); Roger Berkowitz, Fiedrich Nietzsche, the Code of Manu, and the Art of Legislation, 24 CARDOzo L. REv. 1131, 1134-35 (2003).
126
See Linda Ross Meyer, HerbertMorris and Punishment, 22 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 109, 109
(2003); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 648-52 (1998).
127
See Mark Antaki, The CriticalModernism ofHanna Arendt, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
251 (2007); Mark Antaki, The World(lessness) of Human Rights, 49 MCGILL L.J. 203, 205-06
(2004).
128
See SHI- J. LAvi, THE MODERN ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-14 (2005).
129
Lavi argues that the needed move is not to bring metaphysics back into the law but
actually to engage in an ontological investigation of it, which will enable us to see "the law
as it is" rather than as it is perceived by various perspectives or disciplines. See Lavi, supra

note 123, at 816-17.
1so
See Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 377 ("A dark age has come. Welcome
it. Be grateful that your fate was to live in a time when the absence of spirit would demand
so much thought. . . . Perhaps the light will shine more brightly when it rises in
darkness.").
131
See CONSTABLE, supra note 124; Nonet, Positive Law, supra note 121, at 669-72.

132

See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1055-61.

656

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:633

ity's utter downfall.1 33 For other writers in this group, the story might
be told a little differently: it is about the disappearance ofjustice (and
the rise of fairness),134 the decline of law as art (and the rise of technique and regulation),1 35 the eradication of community (and the rise
of identity politics),' 3 6 and so on.
Even if the other writers in this group are not as harsh and cataclysmic in their view of modern law, they dedicate their scholarly efforts to revealing moments in the history of law in which law lost its
dignity and artful form and turned into a machine, an instrument,
and a vehicle for achieving external ends. Thus, this group rejects the
usual modes of historicizing that reveal personal interests, social conflicts, and political battles behind our laws.' 37 Instead, they excavate
untold histories of ancient legal glory and its decline, the destruction
of law as an art form-when law had a "sacrosanct bond to the ethical
activity of life"' 3 -and its degradation into positive law, policy, and
technique.
But aside from the fallen and degraded contemporary law that
these scholars point to, they discover the traditional, often ancient
"good laws."' 3 9 These "good laws," however-obviously not our contemporary positive laws-are not identified through a science-like
method of practical wisdom like modern natural-law theorists such as
Finnis and Grietz claim them to be. Rather,
good Law, like all nobility, requires a certain dulling of the mind; an
instinctive distaste for and dismay at displays of quickness, learning
or 'culture'; a trained (or is it feigned?) incapacity to understand
any sentence that smacks of jesuitical quibbling, word stretching,
140
hair splitting, astute analysis, or logical scaffolding.
133

Nonet describes "law and. . ." as follows:

[T] he odors of law and ... are among the foulest.... Look at the
people with whom law and . . . has populated the earth. Look at that
swarming mass of busy, hurried, restless, racing, ratlike humanity.... See
what and how these beings are: wanting and needing, being deficient, crippled, hence dependent, eager recipients, sufferers, motivated, acted
upon ... never responsible, never punishable, never deserving, only able to
have their future predicted, therefore also superstitiously crawling at the
feet of fortunetellers in abject fear of pain and death....
In law and . . ., though not by it, humanity is defiled.
Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 376-77.
134
BERKOWITZ, supra note 125.
135 LAvi, supra note 128.
136
137

CONSTABLE, THE LAw OF THE OTHER, supra note 124.

138
139

BERKOWITZ, supra note 125, at xiii.

Indeed, the main of legal history could be labeled as another disenchanted theory
of law, which strips it off its metaphysical dignity, unity, and coherence by exposing law as
the outcome of mundane and profane processes and interests. For a critique of this disenchanted mode of historicizing see Tomlins, supra note 65.
See Berkowitz, supra note 125, at 1134 (finding exemplary, "good" legislation in
ancient codes such as the Code of Manu); Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 376.
140 Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 376.
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The good, noble laws are forever lost because "[justice has fled our
world" 141 and because we are living in a unique time when law is divorced from justice and when art is in decline. By going back to the
past, these scholars hope to recover notions of what neighborliness,
punishment, promise, euthanasia, and other juridical concepts once
meant.'4 2 Unveiling their alternative meaning to modern laws demonstrates law's falling while also giving us the invigorating power of
nostalgia.
By now, I hope, it has become clear why I call this group of scholars reenchanters. Though not using this term explicitly, they reject
almost each and every aspect of our modem and disenchanted law: its
positivism, its instrumentality, its transformation into a set of rules and
principles, its rationality, its reduction to policy, its becoming a technique of government,143 and its detachment from justicel 44-in short,
its turning into a scientific-like endeavor. But law, they argue, is something entirely different and enchanted: "law requires that an individual sacrifice his rights, his pride, and even his self to something bigger
and ultimately more meaningful."14 5 And the language of law is "the
language of authority and respect. Our old Lawyers knew how and
what to revere, honor, hallow. Noble souls, they peopled the world
with the likes of themselves, persons in and through whose bodies the
spirit of mankind showed a godlike splendor ... ."1 4 6 The search and
yearning for charismatic and noble legal authorities (lawgivers and
judges), for the reweaving of the transcendental and of justice into
the fabric of law, and for the reappearance of art in our technical and
bureaucratic existence all mark this unique and profound attempt to
reenchant our law and, through it, our world.
D.

The Reenchantment of Legal Authorities

One of the main crises of modernity and a major hallmark of our
disenchanted world is the disappearance of traditional authorities (divine, prophetic, royal). In the legal field, I already argued, the extinction of traditional authorities manifests itself both in lawmaking and
in its application by administrators and judges. 1 4 7 And while lawmaking is unmasked as "the technical means of a compromise between
BERKOWITZ, supra note 125, at ix.
142 Berkowitz, for instance, claims that "we know that there is more to being a neighbor than paying for the damage one does. Only one who understands that he is enmeshed
in a moral world keeps his promise even when it is convenient, efficient, and legal to break
it." Id. at xii.
143 LAvi, supra note 128, at 75-98, 126-71.
144
Constable, supra note 124, at 572-80.
145
BERKOWITZ, supra note 125, at xii.
146
Nonet, Green v. Recht, supra note 63, at 376.
147
See supra Part I.B.

141
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conflicting interests,"' 4 8 adjudication turns into a rational and bureaucratic operation of fact finding and of technical rule application.
Even in common-law systems, the image of the bureaucrat judge was
never really convincing, as she was stripped of her charisma and traditional authority.1 4 9 Indeed, most legal theories of the twentieth century were busily disenchanting the judiciary, even if for different
reasons and based on different jurisprudential grounds. For some of
the realists and their critically inclined followers (critical legal studies,
critical race theory, feminists), it was because judges decided cases
based on their psychology, ideology, or crude "hunch," which exposed
them as regular human beings, devoid of all charismatic or traditional
authority.15 0 But even for many postrealist reconstructivist scholars
who tried to restore the faith in the judiciary and in the legal system, it
was achieved by disenchanting the judiciary even further. This was so
because judges' legitimacy, these theoreticians argued, stemmed from
their heavy reliance on processes and procedures (legal process),151
constitutional or legislative text (constitutionalists and textualists), 152
judicial precedents, or extralegal knowledge (law and economics and
other law and social studies) .153 Put differently, judges might have
been relegitimated and regained the trust of some (since they are no
mere ideologues or usurpers of power), but it was a Pyrrhic victory for
judges' authority since they obtained it through their acquired expertise and hard work-not through tradition or charisma-which made
them further disenchanted (even if more legitimate).
148

See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1065 (quoting 2

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY:

AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 875 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ.

of Cal. Press 1978) (1921-1922)).
149
See Langer, supra note 114 (describing a global movement towards managerial
judging).
150
See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1986) (critique of law as ideology); Cohen, supra note 55, at 846 (the need to study the
psychology of judges); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch"in judicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) (on judicial "hunch" as the determining factor in judgment).
151
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITIcs (1962) (defendingjudicial review on the basis of political theory and legal
process theory); HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (defining procedures and processes that would legitimate the legal process and adjudication).
152
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
(presenting constitutional theory legitimating the Supreme Court).
158
The various law and social-science schools of thought are too many to name, yet
most dominant are "law and economics" and "law and society" (usually meaning sociology
and anthropology. For the purposes of this discussion, normative law and economics is the
best example of a theory that legitimates the judge by subjecting her to the methodology of
economics. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
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Over the past thirty years or so, however, some legal theorists are
reenchanting the figure of the judge. They do so by glorifying judges,
attributing to them traits that are almost godlike, thus restoring
faith-not just trust or legitimacy-in them. This glorification of the
judge is often accompanied by another reenchantment of the legislative process through the concept of deliberative (or discursive) democracy. Thus, law's authority is being reenchanted not through its
substantive normativity, morality, political theory, or virtue but
through the character of the judge and the merits of deliberative democracy. I now turn to briefly examine these reenchantments of law's
authority.
1. Reenchanting the Judge
Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner describe a set of legal theorists
(among them Karl N. Llewellyn, Owen Fiss, Herman Oliphant, and
Anthony T. Kronman) whose theory they label "law as craft."' 5 4 For
these scholars, "law is neither art nor science, but craft," meaning that
at the heart of the law lie "shared professional norms," which are
based on "ways of doing," "working knowhow," and "operating techniques." 15 5 While some of this scholarship draws attention to the complicated objectives and institutional arrangement of the judiciary,
which render it neutral, independent, impartial, and required to reason and write elaborate decisions,15 6 others focus on the personal
traits of the judge: her virtues (which she either has or lacks), her
character, her "common sense," and other elements that are impossible to translate into rules of conduct, procedures, or institutional architecture.15 7 Both Oliphant and Kronman come close to
reinscribing the truly personal, perhaps even the charismatic, into the
description of the work of the lawyer (and the judge): "the illumination which only immediacy affords and the judiciousness which reality
alone can induce;" 58 and the unique combination of two thoroughly
personal traits, sympathy and detachment-rather than theoretical

154 See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The CharacterofLegal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
671 (2011); see also Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VANo. L. REv. 2245, 2274-322 (2001)
(exploring the similarities between the law and other craft traditions).
155
Dagan & Kreitner, supra note 154.
156
OWEN Fiss, THE LAW AS IT CouLD BE 160-67 (2003).
157
See Solum, supra note 103, at 192-93.
158
Herman Oliphant, A Return to StareDecisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 73-75 (1928) (emphasis
added). This characterization might seem somewhat unfair, given Oliphant's attempt to
bind the judge through institutional arrangements much like Fiss. Yet, I think that there is
enough in Oliphant to render him a reenchanter of the judges' charisma or traditional
authority.
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contemplation, intellectual excellence, or instrumental-scientific
knowledge-is what gives the judge her authority.1 5 9
This personalization and glorification of the judge (and the lawyer, who can also be a state administrator) that does not rest on objective, rationalizable, and bureaucratic rules and procedures brings the
authority of the judge close to charismatic authority, and thus reenchants it.
Ronald Dworkin's Hercules is another example of reenchantment of the judge.16 0 The rich and foundational theory of Dworkin
goes well beyond of the scope of this Essay, despite the fact that it
touches upon reenchantment themes that I discussed earlier (the role
of morality in legal interpretation, the unity and integrity of the entire
legal field, the imperative to read texts favorably, the discussion of the
"grounds" of law rather than merely its consequences, and the requirements of "fairness and justice" within law's domain). 16 1 Indeed,
much of Dworkin's enterprise could be characterized as reenchanting
the legal field, not so much because it reconstructs the field such to
legitimate, justify, and stabilize it, but because Dworkin's law almost
replaces religion in the modem world. The empire of law is truly everywhere, and the judges-along with the Constitution-are its rulers.
And the judges receive the legitimacy not of positive legal authority
but of the rule of integrity, fairness, and justice. The great "chain of
interpreters" to which judges belong-stretching almost from ancient
time until our present-and their fidelity to the entire normative cosmos renders them a truly Herculean glory and the aura of an enchanted legal universe.
2.

Reenchanting the Authority of Legislation

Although judges are prone to be reenchanted (at least in common-law systems), the finding of morality, justice, coherence, and
magic in contemporary legislators seems like an impossible task. Still,
some legal (and political) theorists try to do just that through the concept of deliberative (or discursive) democracy. 162 Here, too, I will be
159

ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

325-28 (1993).
160

See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 239-50 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S

EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977).

161
162

See DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 160, at 6-10, 96-98, 219-24, 254-70.
On the concept of deliberative democracy, see JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD

VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

(1994);

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); DELIBERATIVE DE-

MOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); Seyla Benhabib, Introduction: The Democratic Moment and the
Problem of Difference, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE

PoLITlCAL 1, 16 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (introducing a collection of essays aimed at
convincing "intellectuals . . . that democracy can be defended with rigorous argument ... not only with good faith and pious wishes"); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative
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concise and unable to delve into the entrails of democratic theory; I
will only give some cursory remarks on some reenchanting themes
that it entails. Over the past thirty years, and increasingly since the
late 1980s, there has been a deluge of writing on deliberative democracy. 163 Indeed, as the crisis of representative (parliamentary) democracies deepens, 164 and as positive laws lose their legitimacy as a result
thereof, democratic "deliberations" become operative concepts that
not only legitimate the state but also reenchant the legal field. 165
Although it has many variants, the idea behind deliberative democracy is that for our legal system to enjoy real and sustained legitimacy our laws should not be produced by the traditional representative
legislator, executed by regular administrators, or adjudicated in ruleapplying courts. Rather, our laws should be the outcome of a complex, multilayered, and often decentralized deliberative process between "equal citizens," which would infuse our laws with real
democratic and moral legitimacy. Deliberative democracy is indeed
an attempt to inject "authentic" legitimacy into what disenchanted law
sees as a mere political and contingent compromise between competing interests and groups.' 66 Indeed, the very idea that law is merely a
compromise-often a result of power imbalances-is for deliberative
democratic theorists an anathema, a crisis that needs to be solved.
Thus the ideal of "deliberation"-often also associated with JuIrgen
Habermas's ideal-speech situation and radical democracy as well as
Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 67 [hereinafter

Benhabib, DeliberativeModell; Jdirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra,at 21. For a discussion and critique of Habermas's theory

of discursive democracy, see Joshua Cohen, Reflections on Habermas on Democracy, 12 RATIO
JuRis 385 (1999).
163
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
164 For the classic work on the crisis of parliamentary democracy in the early twentieth
century, see CARL SCHMi-rr, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy
trans., 1985). For a more recent account of the severe deficiencies of contemporary parliamentary democracies, see Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711
(2001); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republicanjustificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARv.
L. REv. 1511 (1992).
165 Although it would be impossible for me to discuss it in length, I would like to note
that the surge of constitutional theory and of constitutionalization-in the United States
and abroad-is another mark of the legitimacy crisis of the parliamentary administrative
state and of positive law. Although a constitution is clearly a positive legal document, enacted (and amended) according to legal procedures, therefore obtaining its legitimacy
from its being posited, it enjoys a unique status, either because it is often understood to be a
direct articulation of moral principles or because it embodies a more authentic will of the
population (due to requirements of supermajorities, plebiscites, and so forth). Once
adopted, a constitution, especially if accompanied by judicial review of legislation-a practice adopted in more and more jurisdictions throughout the world-gives the entire legal
field a moral and democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, it gives the legal system an image of
a practice dedicated to the protection of an ancient, sacred, coherent, and authoritative
text.
166
See HANNA FENICHEL PYTRIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 212 (1967).
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Seyla Benhabib's discursive ideals' 6 7-stands in stark contrast to the
realistic and profoundly political disenchanted perspective on the law.
And even though some of these scholars often posit the idea of deliberative democracy as a critical tool against the status quo-calling for a
radical reform of existing democracies rather than enchanting them
as already manifesting this desired ideal-a streak of reenchantment
can still be found in their yearning for a legal system that will be legitimated through nonpositive legality.
In fact, the "reenchantment of legal authority" that I just described involves a different type of reenchantment than the preceding
three types (formalism, virtue, and law as art). Although the previous
three reenchantments were either explicit (overtly rejecting disenchanting themes) or implicit but central to the theory, the reenchantment that I identified in this section seems to exist against the
intention and self-understanding of its authors. It is indeed a marginal-or supplementary-reenchantment that exists, even in a minimal
way, in any effort to view the law as a system (even if not a coherent
one), to find some morality in it (even if minimally in the form of
values, for example), to insist that there is also some degree of meaningful agency for legal actors (even if in the form of practical wisdom), or to claim that all law is best understood as manifesting some
basic idea, principle (e.g., wealth maximization), 16 8 value (such as
"dignity"),169 or ideology (liberalism and patriarchy, to name two
prime examples).170
167 See Benhabib, Deliberative Model, supra note 162, at 67; Cohen, supra note 162, at
387-90; Habermas, supra note 162, at 21.
168 Wealth maximization or efficiency can be seen as such a principle or idea because,
at least for some law and economics scholars, it should serve as the principle according to
which all norms and decisions should be shaped, interpreted, and received. See Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUs WELFARE (2002); Posner, supra note 153; see

also Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challengesfor
Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749 (2011) (defending a more eclectic law and
economics perspective).
169 This is the case of the rise of "dignity" as a foundational value or right in various
jurisdictions throughout the world. In South Africa, Germany, Israel, Canada, and the
United States, as well as in numerous international documents, dignity has become, over
the past twenty years, an explicitly enshrined or implicit fundamental value or right. Submitting the entire legal system to one core value or right-even if understood as serving
functional goals and as rational procedure-is a highly reenchanting maneuver since it
gives the legal system coherence, unity, and moral legitimation. On the rise of dignity, see
generally THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTs: HUMAN DIGNIrY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J.
Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); EDWARDJ. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VIsIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2002).

170 Indeed, even those who see law as an effective expression or vehicle for the achievement of "ideology," be it socialist, Marxist, free marketer, feminist, or nationalist, in fact
reenchant law to a certain degree. For example, some feminist legal scholarship, highly
committed to structuralist conceptions regarding the relationship between men and women (what Halley calls the "men over women" conception), belongs to this type of legal
reenchantment. See HALLEY, supTa note 60.
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In these marginal/supplementary reenchantments, it matters
greatly what the degree of this unintended reenchantment is. Although
it is indeed unavoidable that some reenchantment will appear, the
question is whether it consumes the entire disenchanting project, so
to speak. I therefore think that even in theories that do not rejectexplicitly or meaningfully-the disenchanting tenets, it is still important to observe the unintended elements of legal reenchantment
(unity, coherence, functionality and instrumentality, morality, and
charisma) and observe how dominant they are.

EVALUATING

III
LEGAL REENCHANTMENT

What the various reenchanters share, despite their different intellectual origins and conflicting jurisprudential creeds, is an antagonism to the realist-inspired legal theories and an aspiration to find in
the law an old-new meaning-a meaning that will transcend the disenchanted visions viewing law "merely" as a social instrument, a political compromise, a dominating structure, a historical contingence, or a
cultural artifact. The reenchanters articulate an understanding of law
that reasserts its inherent morality; commitment to transcendental wisdom, truth, and values; artful being; and nonpositivist authority. As
against the disenchanted, realist, and fragmentary vision, they present
an enchanted, idealist, antifunctional, and holistic countervision.
And although some reenchanters are self-professed formalists and
others vehement antiformalists, all are united in their opposition to
the disenchanted, profane presentation by the various progenies of
legal realism: critical legal scholars, legal empiricists, law and economics scholars, legal historians, legal feminists, and students of law and
society.
One possible objection to my claim is that I have described marginal, perhaps even esoteric, legal theories that have had little influence
on the main of legal academia in the United States and even less impact on the way legal practitioners-judges, lawyers, administratorsthink about and practice law. I admit that some of the legal schools of
thought that I analyzed have not changed the legal landscape, which
by and large remains committed to the disenchanted view of law.
However, I think that once the linkages between these supposedly isolated and marginal legal theories are exposed there emerges the growing tendency-or at least the theoretical foundation and possibilityof legal scholarship to turn the gaze from questions of indeterminacy,
power, and consequences to debates about the grounds of law and to
conceptual and even metaphysical deliberations.
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"Law and . . . " versus "Law as . . . "

It might be helpful to reformulate my claim about the reenchantment of law in the following way: while disenchanted legal theoreticians attempt to investigate the realities of law by viewing it as a social
instrument with knowable origins (historical, social, political, and technological) and realeffects in the world and therefore turn to the social
sciences through "law and. . . " methodologies-law and economics,

law and history, law and psychology, law and philosophy, law and literature, and so on-the reenchanters try to imagine the ideality of law171
through a turn to "law as. . ." methodologies-law as morality, law as
virtue, law as love, law as art.1 72 Although the move from "and" to "as"
does not necessarily mean that we abandon realist, functionalist, or
consequentialist analyses (after all, "law as culture" might mean that
we analyze the functioning of law as a cultural, hence ideological, apparatus and further disenchant it),173 it can still help us understand
the radical jurisprudential shift that some reenchanters wish to make.
171
When I talk about "ideality" I do not mean "normativity." Although normative endeavors might often include what I call "marginal" or "supplementary" reenchantment,
ideality refers to an antirealist and antifunctionalist view of the law. See discussion infra Part
III.B.
172 In April 2010, the conference "'Law As... ': Theory and Method in Legal History"
was held at the University of California, Irvine Law School. The public invitation to the
conference reads as follows:
The "law and" problematic has been highly productive. The question
nevertheless arises whether we have arrived at an intellectual moment in
which, a century after its invention, "law and" has run its course. If so, what
might be the implications for legal history?
"Law and" relies on empirical context to situate law as a determinate
domain of activity. The result is a causally functional and empirical account
of law....
Suppose we dispense with the conjunctive metaphors of "law and," and
instead reach for different metaphors. What might they be? One possibility is optical metaphors-that is, metaphors of appearance, or image, or
resemblance. Instead of parsing relations between distinct domains of activity, between law and what lies "outside" it, the objective of legal historical
research might be to imagine them as the same domain: what do we get if
we imagine law and economy as the same phenomenon-that is, law as
economy (or economy as law)? What of law as art, as science, as war, as
peace? What new method or theory might be the result?
Dan Ernst, "Law As. . ." at UC Irvine, LEGAL HisT. BLOG (Feb. 3, 2010, 2:23 AM) http://
[hereinafter UC Irvine
legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/law-as-at-uc-irvine.html
Invitation].
173
Indeed, "law as culture" often entails some antirealist impetus. This is the case
because cultural analysis of law often involves hermeneutic arguments about meaning and
signification rather than empirical, consequentialist, or instrumentalist assertions. As Robert Cover asserts, "the capacity of law to imbue action with significance is not limited to
resistance or disobedience. Law is a resource in signification that enables us to submit,
rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate or dignify." See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 8 (1983). Likewise, "law as art" might be a
critical and disenchanting project focused on the power dimension in law-if we see art as
a locus of power struggles (as in a Nietzschean "will to power"), contestation, and politics.
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While the idea of "law and . . . " contemplates distinct sphereslaw, economics, literature, history, psychology-that are reaching out
to each other to benefit from one another and fill in respective gaps,
the "law as . . . " idiom projects a different image. Indeed, the shift

from and to the metaphorical as projects a world image in which the
domains of human action are not really separate or distinct-they
bear resemblance, if not identity. 174 Much like in the enchanted
world that was lost where all domains were part of religion; part of
God's unified world; and equivalent in reflecting God's glory, will, and
cosmic order, "law as art" and "law as love" also mean that art is like
law and love is like law, and all reflect transcendental and metaphysical truths. In this reenchanted world, the distinct domains regain
their unity through their metaphorical relations.
But let me now leave the metaphor of "law as . . . " to understand
what more is at stake in the different reenchanting theoretical
approaches.
B. The Stakes of Legal Reenchantment
As I have emphasized throughout this Essay, perhaps the most
crucial effect of the rise of reenchanting theories is a waning of the
tension between critical and reconstructionist legal theories and a loss
of interest in the problems that these opponents understood themselves to address. Let me be clear: law's indeterminacy and power
have not been miraculously resolved by the reenchanters; they are
simply not the most important or the most interesting questions in
their mind. In fact, for some of them these "problems" demonstrate a
profound misunderstanding of the law and of the task of those who
inhabit the legal domain.
Again, this is not to say that questions of objectivity and determinacy become moot or unimportant in contemporary jurisprudence;
these are still very much debated indeed. Yet, the reenchanters take
explicit issue with other questions that have been neglected and supposedly made irrelevant by the apparent triumph of legal realism.
The assertion that legal formalism is "not dead" should therefore not
be read as a repetition of the debate between formalists and antiformalists of the early twentieth century but as a resurrection of metaphysics after its relative repression for at least half a century.
Similarly, what might be seen as a renewed interest in natural lawquestions ofjustice and morality-by the "law as art" followers is not a
Finnis-like natural-law theory that was still in the grips of the realist
indeterminacy debate; it is, on the contrary, a displacement of this
debate and a rejection of a "secularized" and "rationalized" version of
174

See UC Irvine Invitation, supra note 172.
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natural law in favor of an almost mystical understanding of law as
justice.
One could say, therefore, that the reenchanters present an idealist investigation into the law, as compared to the realist query that
focused on law's functionality and instrumentality. There is something to this suggestion, but I want to clarify that the idealism of the
reenchanters has two distinct meanings. First, it is a truly ideal, unreal
world; it is a forever-hidden moral world that never existed on this
earth, yet it guides-indeed it must guide-our actions.1 75 Contemporary formalists and virtuists belong in this idealist camp. The second
group of idealists consists of the "law as art" theorists. For them, the
ideal world is not other-worldly at all. On the contrary, it was very
real, but it disappeared. The ideality of the law, therefore, cannot be
a guiding or a regulating principle. All it can do is to make us think
about the present and hope that a new dawn will shine upon us.
Once reenchanting theories shift the jurisprudential debates, a
new set of questions arises: If not assessing and evaluating consequences and effects through different methodologies, what should legal theory be about? And what should the task of the legal academic
be if not to provide an estimation of the effects of legal rules and
doctrines, critique them, and provide normative proposals? And is
the dismissal of all these realist and postrealist questions inherently
reactionary since it ignores distribution, domination, and power? In
this Essay I have not made a serious attempt to answer these difficult
questions but merely raise them and, perhaps, offer some cursory remarks regarding them.
First, if reenchantment is to succeed, legal theory should be
about the grounds of law rather than its consequences, about its
meaning and not its effects, about its transcendental virtues rather
than its power, and about its metaphysical underpinning rather than
its function. Such reenchanting theories, as I elaborated earlier, do
not possess one answer or have one position regarding which
grounds, what meaning, and which virtues the law has; however, they
seek to argue about these matters rather than focus on what function
law should serve, what its real effects in the world are, and what power
relations it manifests (and brings about).
Second, a possible and interesting implication might be a methodological shift from examining law with the aid of the social sciences
to looking at it through the prism of the humanities, of philosophy.
While the humanities, too, might offer consequentialist evaluations of
legal doctrines (Marxist historical analysis and philosophical pragma175 This ideal world (of Kant and Hegel) is the object of Marx's critique. See KIL
MAx & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 39-41, 68-72 (CJ. Arthur ed., 1970).
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tism are prime examples), a prevalent tendency of the humanities is a
focus on finding grounds and meaning, rather than analyzing possible, let alone actual, consequences. Hence, the investigation of the
legal materials is redirected from outcomes to meaning: not what law
does, but what it says, how it tells, what it means, and what it is.' 76
Thus, the way to discover-perhaps "uncover" is a more accurate
term-these hidden meanings, grounds, and underpinnings of the
law is often through historical analysis, cultural critique, or philosophical contemplation. Indeed, this shift to the humanities is apparent
also in reenchanting theories which were not discussed in this Essay;
already in earlier works of the cultural study of the law (such as Robert
M. Cover's groundbreaking Nomos and Narrative), one could trace the
strong antirealist and anticonsequentialist attitude of legal reenchantment.1 77 Such works turn away from social-science positivism toward
humanities' hermeneutical approach, from consequence to
meaning.1 78
I would like to clarify that discussions of the meaning of a legal
rule, as opposed to its effects, are not necessarily reenchanting. Indeed, at times a meaning of a rule might include its effects and consequences, and sometimes such analyses expose power relations and
social structures hidden in and perpetuated through the law. Yet,
often such cultural analyses oppose, explicitly or implicitly, the disenchanted instrumentalist view of the law by rejecting the idea that
legal rules and doctrines can-or even should-be rationally and intentionally designed in order to advance desired social goals. This
rejection might stem from a global suspicion of the ability to calculate
social consequences in advance (suspicion of "social engineering") or
from an aversion to thinking about societies and cultures as rationally
manipulable objects due to their complex and even mysterious
nature.
Third, it would be tempting to view reenchanting theories as politically reactionary, yet I think it is not a necessary trait. On the face
of it, reenchanting theories, since they refuse to deal with-or at least
set aside-the consequence, the real impact, or the actual effect of
legal rules and doctrines might seem politically regressive. This is so
especially in light of many realist and postrealist studies that have
demonstrated the pro-status quo bias that legal rules, structures, and
institutions have. On the other hand, as a factual matter, substantively, the reenchanting theories that I have discussed are no more
176
As Lavi argues, the ontological investigation aims at discovering what the law really
is and not what we can know about it from one perspective or another. Lavi, supra note
123.
177
See Cover, supra note 173, at 8.
178
See, e.g., MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL (2011).
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progressive or conservative than the main of contemporary legal theories.179 Furthermore, if we adopt a broader view of reenchantmentone which includes theories with a significant "supplementary" and
unintended reenchantment component in the form of a strong regulating ideality-it becomes clear that there is nothing inherently conservative about reenchantment. What would determine the political
valance of such theories is, rather, the "values" or regulatory principles which underlie the theory's normativity.
A fourth, interlinked implication of law's reenchantment is a possible realignment between critical and noncritical legal theories, due
to the complicated relationship that some strands of critical legal studies have with the concepts of disenchantment and reenchantment. Although critical legal scholars are not nostalgic for charisma, authority,
unity, or transcendence, some of them (Duncan Kennedy is the prime
example) have a clear streak of irrationalism, which is a hallmark of
reenchantment.1 8 0 Indeed, the irrationalist and decisionist element
in critical legal studies' (CLS) rendition of law and of adjudicationemphasizing the fact that legal decisions are forever filled with contradictions, inconsistencies, gaps, and inexplicable decisions-sets it
apart from many other postrealist legal theories that explicitly reject
the irrationalist moment in law or simply ignore it. In this sense,
CLS-at least in its irrationalist mode-bears the paradoxical affinity
to the noncritical legal theories, some of which were discussed in this
Essay: suspicion of instrumental rationality, refusal to believe in purely
rational adjudication and deliberation, and an insistence that law cannot be reduced to policy, science or artful balancing of competing
principles and values. The focus and insistence on the irrational, on
that which cannot be articulated through rules and procedures, and
on the moment of "magical" decision-all these become common
grounds for critical and other reenchanting (although noncritical) legal theories, as against the fully rational, instrumentalist, and highly
functionalist approaches to the law. It is therefore possible to categorize CLS as including an important ingredient of reenchantment.
Yet on other issues, CLS's reenchantment directly opposes the
reenchanting theories that I earlier described. Metaphysics, conceptual philosophy, virtue, or revered past are all excluded and denied as
ways out of the irrationalist moment of decision by critical legal scholars. Thus, the skepticism that CLS demonstrates toward various stabilizing and unifying solutions characterizes it, indeed, as both
179 Indeed, while the legal realists were predominantly progressive, their contemporary progenies and legal instrumentalists are not. The realist cry that law should reflect
current social reality was the basis for politically progressive reforms a hundred years ago,
but it is no longer the case now.
180 See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STN. L. REv. 1 (1984)
(discussing the irrationalist position within critical legal studies).
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disenchanting and reenchanting: on the one hand, it continues the
realist trajectory of fragmentation and demystification of the legal
field; on the other hand, it refuses to see law merely as a site of solvable problems or as the "technical means of a compromise between
conflicting interests,"' 8 1 reducible to rational policy making and balancing of values. For CLS, law always involves the irrational, the singular, and the "leap of faith" of the deciding actor; hence law is
reenchanted at the same moment of its most profound disenchantment. Thus reenchantment both unifies and divides opposing jurisprudential movements, making it even more obvious that the grounds
of jurisprudence are indeed shifting.
CONCLUSION: THE POSSIBLE

FUTURE

OF LAW'S REENCHANTMENT

As Kennedy explains, Weber saw the possibility of irrationality, of
disintegration into sects, and of growing enchantment (in the form of
mysticism, for example) in almost every domain but never gave it
much thought in the legal field.18 2 It is our task, therefore, to ask
whether contemporary legal reenchanters are the legal "flight into the
irrational," the legal parallels of "the irrationalization of religion."18 3
One possible answer is that indeed they are. Even so, they might not
pose a real danger to our disenchanted legal world. After all, Weber
was extremely pessimistic about the option to turn the tide and escape
the "iron cage of modernity" and therefore thought that irrationalist
tendencies would end up losing. 18 4
But the question whether humans can ever regain true faith in
that which was lost centuries ago-in divine laws, in oracles and
prophets, in charismatic judges and kings, in the ability to deduce particular rules from highly abstract concepts, and so on-is an open
one. While I tend to share Weber's view that disenchantment is a oneway street, I also sympathize with the Nietzschean and Heideggerian
hope that where there is danger, there lies hope (and vice versa). 18 5
It might be scary, but a faith that was lost can possibly be regained.
And if people once thought that texts possessed one sole meaning,
and if they once experienced trials by fire as the manifestation of justice, perhaps one day we will wake up and humanity will have this faith
181
182

2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 875. See supra text accompanying note 38.
See 2 WEBER, supra note 29, at 874-75, 1031-32.

183

Id.

at 889.

See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1030-52.
185
I am aware of the great difference that can be made between Nietzschean and
Heideggerian hope. For Heideggerian reenchanters, there is an obvious mourning for a
lost world, and we must try to find our way back into it; Nietzschean reenchantment, however, basically-and perhaps desperately-calls upon us to reenchant the world not by
finding our way back to the lost world, but by creating a new world through our will and
joy. I thank Pierre Schlag for this point.
184
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again. The religious revival around us might point to the fact that this
is indeed the case.
What should be thought about the various grand theories that try
to reenchant law? Is it not good, after all, that at least some degree of
faith is being restored in our laws? More importantly, is it not a good
development that the technical, crude, instrumentalist vision of lawmaking and adjudication is replaced by a vision that reimagines a law
that has "metaphysical dignity?" 186 Perhaps so, but if it comes with a
complete dismissal of questions of domination and power, of distribution and politics, I am inclined to say that it would be better for us to
stick to a more disenchanted, fragmented, and eclectic view of the
law. We should therefore all worry about Weber's prophecy:
The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.'
Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from
public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into
the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. It is not
accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental,
nor is it accidental that today only within the smallest and most intimate circles, in personal human situations, in pianissimo, that something is pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which
in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together. If we attempt to force and to 'invent' a monumental style in art, such miserable monstrosities are
produced as the many monuments of the last twenty years. If one
tries intellectually to construe new religions without a new and genuine prophecy, then, in an inner sense, something similar will result, but with still worse effects. And academic prophecy, finally, will
create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community. 8 7
Let us hope that the reenchanting theories will master the art of
the "pianissimo" rather than the monstrosities of the monumental
and that their "academic prophecy" will not join the fanatical sects
that are already part of our academic life.

186
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See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 875.
EsSAYs, supra note 26, at 155.
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